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Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration
Mary Fan

Introduction
Amid economic and political turmoil, anti-immigrant legislation has
flared again among a handful of fiercely determined states.1 To justify
the intrusion into national immigration enforcement, the dissident
states invoke imagery of invading hordes of “illegals”2—though the
unauthorized population actually fell by nearly two-thirds, decreasing by about a million people, between 2007 and 2009 as the recession
reduced the lure of jobs.3
Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070—recently invalidated in part by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States4—led the charge.5 By preelection-year summer 2011, several states enacted laws patterned after
Arizona’s controversial Senate Bill 1070, including Alabama’s even
more aggressive HB 56.6 A host of lawsuits are pending against the new
laws,7 which are at least partially invalid after Arizona v. United States.
Other controversial proposals circulate, such as eliminating birthright
citizenship or branding the birth certificates of alleged “anchor babies”
implanted in the United States by foreigners.8
This chapter examines how the spurt of state legislation is a proxy
way to vent resurgent racialized anxieties and engage in friend-enemy
politics founded on conflict with the “Other”—the foreign enemy
within—in a time of economic and political turmoil. Despite the
>>
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ostensibly a-racial construct of the illegal alien used to legitimize the
lashing out, it is suffused with racialized perception.9 Current tactics
parallel the overtly racialized hostility of past episodes of states enacting out anti-immigrant legislation. The oft-raised concern in such a
fiercely polarized time is racial discrimination. Antidiscrimination law,
however, does not offer the remedy for this concern.
The chapter explores alternate frames for rendering antidiscrimination commitments legally legible. Rather than striking dissident
state immigration legislation because of the interests of “them”—
the marginalized people most impacted by the laws—invalidation is
grounded in shared interests and constitutional commitments. Convergent interests include the constitutionally designed balance of federal power on issues requiring coordinated rather than conflicting
approaches. Such an approach mitigates polarization by making convergent interests, rather than racial divergence, salient. Hearteningly,
recent landmark decisions, including Arizona v. United States, do not
ignore antidiscrimination values. Rather, the decisions illuminate
the shared interests impacted by discrimination concerns, such as
impairment of foreign relations and commerce. This chapter analyzes
the way antidiscrimination values inform preemption analyses used
to invalidate encroaching state immigration laws fueled by fear and
loathing.
Part 1 analyzes two hot-button forms of resurgent state and local
anti-“alien” laws of our times—laws patterned on the Arizona template and the anti–birthright citizenship movement. It explores the
dominance of racialized anxieties behind the seemingly race-neutral construct of the vilified alien. Part 2 contrasts the friend-enemy
politics and legislation of our contemporary scene with the state and
local legislation and furor against the Chinese during the turbulent
politics of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Part 3 examines the polarization-ameliorating bases for decisions to cut back on
overreaching state and local laws in order to make shared interests,
rather than racial difference, salient while protecting underlying antidiscrimination values. The approach helps build bridges between dissonant worldviews to navigate the profoundly polarized politics and
legislation of our times.
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I. The Resurgence of Aggressive State Anti-“Alien” Laws
Two of the most aggressive and controversial forms of state and
local anti-immigrant legislation include (1) the “attrition-throughenforcement”-type laws patterned after Arizona Senate Bill 1070 that
aim to drive out perceived aliens by creating a hostile environment
through a multifront attack and (2) and the anti–birthright citizenship
movement aimed against U.S.-born children of aliens.
A. The “Attrition-through-Enforcement” Attack Strategy
The strategy behind the “attrition through enforcement” approach is
to create an atmosphere of fear that drives undocumented people to
“self-deport.” As the bill’s cosponsor, Arizona State Representative John
Kavanagh, explained, “it’s about creating so much fear they will leave
on their own.”10 The details of the laws vary somewhat, but they share a
similar strategy of creating a totalizing atmosphere of hostility through
a multipronged attack.
For example, Arizona’s template law directs police to check immigration status during mundane traffic and other temporary stops if there is
a “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful status.11 Though it generally is not
a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States, the legislation also authorizes police to arrest people without warrant based on
probable cause of removability due to commission of a public offense.12
Reaching into private interactions, some of the new laws also criminalize such mundane but vital activities as job seeking by aliens, giving a
ride or renting to a suspected undocumented person, or leaving home
without carrying alien registration documents.13
To take Alabama’s particularly aggressive example, the state’s controversial House Bill 56 criminalized, among other things, transporting
someone or entering into a rental agreement in “reckless disregard[]”
of a person’s undocumented status.14 The controversial rental provision was later legislatively deleted in May 2012.15 Plainly, the criminalization of such mundane things as giving rides or renting—without
even requiring knowledge of undocumented status—chills interaction
with people who might be undocumented. Alabama’s legislation even
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reaches into the schoolhouse, requiring school officials to determine the
immigration status of children.16
The laws press public officials and private actors—willing or not—
into creating an atmosphere of surveillance and suspicion.17 In the
process, the laws upend previous policies aimed at building community trust.18 To prevent the problem of crime victims fearing to turn to
police or to bear witness, many police agencies have assured immigrant
communities that they are not immigration-law enforcers.19 Upending the wisdom built on experience, the new breed of laws bars police
from nonparticipation in federal immigration enforcement.20 Arizona’s
template law also authorizes warrantless arrests of persons the officer believes has committed “any public offense that makes the person
removable from the United States.”21 The Arizona law also requires that
law enforcement officers in any lawful stop, detention, or arrest attempt
to determine immigration status if “reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien who is unlawfully present” unless “the determination
may hinder or obstruct an investigation.”22
As originally enacted, the law provided that officers “may not solely
consider race, color or national origin,”23 apparently taking advantage
of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
providing that race can be a relevant—albeit not sole—factor in establishing reasonable suspicion of alienage.24 Brignoni-Ponce held that
“[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien
is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but
standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to
ask if they are aliens.”25
In response to the firestorm of controversy, the Arizona legislature
amended Senate Bill 1070 to delete the adjective “solely.”26 As amended,
the law provides that officials may not consider race, color, or national
origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona
Constitution”27—which under Brignoni-Ponce means what the law said
before: that race can be a relevant but not a sole factor.28 The amendment gave Arizona some cover, however, in the ensuing political and
legal battles. Indeed, the district court of Arizona apparently missed the
wiggle clause and analyzed the law as if it barred consideration of race,
color, or national origin.29 The states claim that their legislation avoids
impermissibly intruding on the federal power over foreign affairs,30
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foreign commerce, 31 and nationality rules32 because they merely mirror
and enforce federal standards.33 A host of other provisions in the Arizona law were constructed as mirror images—in some instances imperfectly so—of federal immigration crimes in an attempt to further thrust
Arizona into immigration law and policy.34 The state law criminalizes
failing to carry alien registration documents, transporting aliens, inducing aliens to enter Arizona, and employing illegal aliens, among other
actions.35 The act also goes further than federal law in criminalizing the
actions of applying for work, soliciting work, or performing work by an
undocumented person.36
Arizona’s template for the new breed of state laws was fueled by
incendiary politics painting Arizona as a state under siege. Bill sponsor Senator Pearce explained that his impetus was to stem the flood of
Mexicans, proclaiming, “We have been overrun. . . . [M]illions more
will come behind them, and we will be overrun to the point that there
will no longer be a United States of America. . . . How long will it be
before we will be just like Mexico?”37 Arizona governor Jan Brewer proclaimed, “We cannot afford all this illegal immigration and everything
that comes with it, everything from the crime and [sic] to the drugs
and the kidnappings and the extortion and the beheadings and the fact
that people can’t feel safe in their community.”38 The president of the
Arizona Sheriff ’s Association, Paul Babeu, also helped sound the crime
and immigration alarm, telling FOX News that criminal “illegals” were
to blame for Arizona having “the highest crime rates in America.”39
In reality, Arizona is experiencing as much of a decline in crime as
the national average, if not more.40 Figures 8.1 and 8.2 plot crime rate
data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for Arizona compared to
the nation as a whole. As depicted, Arizona’s crime rate, like that of the
nation overall, has been falling dramatically in recent years. Indeed,
in 2009, Arizona enjoyed a lower violent crime rate than the nation
overall. And while the curve for Arizona’s property crime rate has
been higher than the national average, by 2009, the gap was narrowing
because Arizona has experienced a steeper decline in property crimes
than the national average.
Indeed, sociologists have argued that rather than aggravating crime,
immigrants have a “protective” effect against crime. The protective effect
stems from such factors as immigrants diluting violent street culture
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Figure 8.1. Arizona vrs. national violent crime rate per 100,000 of the poplulation.

with new norms: downplaying violence as the appropriate response to
perceived slights, emphasizing strong family and ethnic ties, and revitalizing abandoned or malaised neighborhoods.41 A new study using
pooled time-series cross-sectional data found that cities with the greatest declines in homicides and robberies had the largest influx of immigrants.42 But perception—and social cascades of misperception spurred
by opinion leaders—are what count in politics. And the immigrationcrime paradigm helped spur passage of Arizona Senate Bill 1070.
The Arizona attrition attack strategy is not the first of recent state
legislation attempting to intervene in regulating immigrant life. During another intense anti-immigrant political broil, for example, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007.43 The law makes
it a state-law offense to “knowingly” or “intentionally” employ “an unauthorized alien,” defined so as to incorporate the federal-law definition of
illegal status.44 The law also mandates that employers verify the employment eligibility of new hires using the E-Verify system,45 though under
federal law, E-Verify is only a voluntary-use pilot program, in part
because of concerns about the risk of error and resultant discrimination. The mandates are backed by penalties centered on licensing revocation, relying on a savings clause for “licensing and similar laws” in the
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Figure 8.2. Arizona vrs. national property crime rate per 100,000 of the poplulation.

express preemption provision of the federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA). The Supreme Court ruled that the law was valid
under the licensing savings clause, noting that the law was confined
to licensing of in-state businesses, not an area of traditional federal
dominance.46
The distinguishing aspect of the new breed of laws, however, is the
multifront attack with the aim of “attrition” —interfering in the admission and expulsion of suspected aliens—by rendering suspected foreigners into an untouchable caste.47 Because of the prevalence of race,
language, and culture-based heuristics for outsider alienage—cognitive
rules of thumb that may generate persistent biases—the laws sweep
overbroadly to impact people perceived as foreign, even if lawfully
present. Concern over the impact on people perceived as foreign has
roused protest not only within the United States but also abroad, interfering with diplomatic relations.48
Decades ago, the Supreme Court explained that in enacting a uniform national immigration system, Congress manifested the purpose
of leaving the law-abiding “free from the possibility of inquisitorial
practices and police surveillance. . . .”49 The new breed of laws aggressively transgresses this approach in aiming for an atmosphere of fear
and hostility that impacts not only those who are unlawfully present
but also those who are suspected to be so because of race, culture, and
language.
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B. The Attack on U.S.-Born Children of Noncitizen Parents
Another movement afoot is the attack on U.S.-born children of alien
parents. Proponents would overrule longstanding Supreme Court
precedent and rewrite the Constitution to deny citizenship to nativeborn people whose parents are noncitizens.50 The movement capitalizes on anti–illegal alien hostility to claim a righteous struggle against
the sinister, sneaking “anchor baby” and the alleged incentive to enter
the United States illegally in order to gain birthright citizenship for the
baby.51 But behind the anti–“illegal alien invasion” banner, the movement has an even more aggressive aim.
Proponents argue that even native U.S.-born children of many lawfully present noncitizens should not be birthright citizens.52 Legislative
proposals aim to exclude children of parents lawfully present on temporary visas.53 Most broadly, theorists trying to justify the attack suggest
that children of foreign nationals in general, lawfully present or not, are
ineligible for birthright citizenship.54 Proponents would exclude from
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, for
example, first-generation Americans, such as this writer, born of people
who lawfully immigrated to America to attend school or lawfully reside
in America on work visas. The scope of the attack shows the enduring
wisdom behind Martin Niemöller’s poem that begins, “First they came
for the [vilified group] and I did not speak out / Because I was not a
[member of the vilified group].” The poem ends, “Then they came for
me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”
To achieve their aim, proponents strain constitutional text and seek
to overrule Framer intent, longstanding precedent, and the progress of
American history and antidiscrimination values. Forged in the post–
Civil War era of progress in humanity and equality values, Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.”55 Automatic
citizenship for U.S.-born people bound the nation to the mast against
the demons of racial loathing and caste carving that resulted in decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, ruling that descendants of African
slaves, even if emancipated, cannot be citizens.56
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The criterion that U.S.-born people must be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States is a narrow exception to birthright citizenship
for the children of foreign ambassadors, hostile enemies in occupation,
and Native Americans of sovereign tribes not taxed. The scope of the
restrictive clause was settled by the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Wong Kim Ark in 1868.57 The Court ruled that a Chinese American born in the United States to legal permanent resident parents was a
U.S. citizen within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Wong Kim Ark linked the interests of first-generation Chinese with
those of first-generation Europeans in explaining its interpretation of
the Citizenship Clause. The Court reasoned, “To hold that the fourteenth amendment of the constitution excludes from citizenship the
children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English,
Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who have always
been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.”59 The Court
concluded that whatever the animosities that led the political branches
to exclude Chinese, the judiciary branch must “give full effect to the
peremptory and explicit language” of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
Latter-day revisionists argue that the notion of citizenship flowing
from birth within the dominion (jus soli) is a feudal notion that clashes
with American values. They argue for citizenship based on consent of
the subject and of the nation. While they claim that this is a progressive
vision, it is in actuality a cruelly regressive attempt to unbind ourselves
from the mast of interests joined across racial lines that has weathered the shifting racial animosities of the day. Community consent to
belonging is influenced strongly by race. Without the automaticity of
place of birth as a unifying force of belonging, there is a danger that
racial fear and loathing would split the nation.
Campaigners against U.S.-born children of noncitizens are also
wrong in oversimplifying the choice as between a supposed outmoded
feudal concept and the purported progressive notion of consent. The
heritage and purpose of American birthright citizenship is not the feudal tradition of the past but rather the realization that leaving citizenship to the vagaries of racial animosities would lose the progress hard
won in the Civil War that ravaged the nation.
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II. Friend-Enemy Politics
In another society under strain, riven by economic woes and fierce
doubt, Carl Schmitt argued that the fundamental distinction on which
political life rests is that of friend and enemy.61 The enemy is “the other,
the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially
intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the
extreme case, conflicts with him are possible.”62 As for the friend side of
the equation, the “us” in a democratic polity, Schmitt argued that homogeneity was crucial and necessitated—“if the need arises—elimination
or eradication of heterogeneity.”63 He cited as examples the expulsion
of the Greeks from Turkey and the prevalence of national laws, such as
those of Australia at the time, restricting immigrants to the “right type
of settler.”64
Schmitt wrote during the economic travails of the Weimar Republic preceding the Third Reich, for which he would be later the “crown
jurist.”65 He openly voiced a logic that flares with particular ferocity
when nations struggle with economic travails and doubts. In the past
and our present, the political66 and the polity reinvigorate in times
of doubt and turmoil through conflict with the “Other” and attempts
to purge this foreign enemy within. Dissident political groups try to
rouse support against current power holders using a rallying cry of
threat with an explicitly or implicitly racialized face. This process of
pronounced differentiation is a means through which faith and fervor in an “us” as an identity is regenerated despite the travails of the
times.
Those vilified and used to define the boundary between our national
“us” and the threatening “Other” have historically taken different—generally raced—forms. Nativists of the past have vilified the Italians, Jews,
Eastern Europeans, Irish, Blacks, Japanese, and Chinese, among others.67
Demonstrating the acutely racialized nature of animosity, out-group
Caucasians were often not perceived as white but instead as degraded
“swarthy types” in the Social Darwinian scale.68 In this multitextured
history of animosity, the story of the intensification of hostility and
state and local laws against the Chinese in California around the time of
the severe recession of the 1870s has resonances with, and insights for,
our contemporary political and legal scene.
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A. Déjà Vu Politics
In 1878, Representative Horace Davis of California said of the
“Chinaman,”
Twenty-eight years ago the pioneer Chinaman was welcomed with an
eager curiosity, but with no foresight of the eventful consequences of
his coming. To-day, he is found in every village, in every mining camp,
utterly an alien in the body-politic, and like some foreign substance in
the human body, breeding fever and unrest till that system is relieved of
its unwelcome presence.69

Times were getting tougher after the boom years of the 1850s drew the
Chinese to the gold fields, swamps, and mountains of California to clear
the land and lay the tracks for the then-expanding economy. By the time
of the severe recession that seized the United States in the 1870s, “many
thousands of unemployed men” were saying “with great bitterness that
but for [the Chinese] presence work and bread would be plenty.”70 The
Chinese were accused of degrading labor and displacing white workers,
of being by nature “voluntary slaves,” capable of subsisting and living
cheaply like vermin.71 Opponents warned that masses of Chinese would
render America an “Asiatic state.”72 The fear over the racial transformation of the nation and states presents a parallel with contemporary
fears, voiced, for example, by Senator Russell Pearce, sponsor of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, of America being “overrun” by “illegal aliens” and
transformed into Mexico.73
In another tactic with parallels to our present, the vilified alien
“Chinaman” was associated with crime; advocates of anti-Chinese legislation warned that China was sending masses of its unwanted criminals.74 The Chinese were accused of, among other things, selling and
buying their women, gambling, prostitution, thievery, and violence
against whites.75
In a third striking parallel with our present, fractious political groups
campaigned against the presidential administration tenuously in power
by whipping up anti-immigrant sentiment. In the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, national politics were closely divided, with control
of Congress and the presidency frequently shifting between the two
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parties.76 Two “minority presidents” failed to win a majority of the vote
and two presidents were elected on close splits, with a bare majority of
less than twenty-five thousand votes.77 In an example of the tactics of the
anti-administration reform politics of the era, a “Committee of Fifty”
assembled in San Francisco decried the president and national government for “wantonly den[ying] to the people of the Pacific . . . relief
from a scourge that menaces their very existence”—the “invasion of the
subjects of the Mongolian empire.”78 They castigated the Republican
presidents for opposing their calls to purge the Chinese, ignoring their
“pleading for deliverance.”79
B. Déjà Vu Laws
In this foment of overtly racialized hostility, state and local laws were
deployed in an attempt to expel the Chinese through direct and indirect methods. These state immigration interventions sometimes tried
to skirt and sometimes unabashedly usurped the federal power over
foreign commerce and admission of aliens.
In 1849, the Supreme Court held in The Passenger Cases that states
may not interfere with the federal power to regulate foreign commerce
by imposing passenger head taxes on ships entering a port.80 In one of
eight opinions in the case, Justice McLean suggested that while “the
municipal power of a State cannot prohibit the introduction of foreigners brought to this country under the authority of Congress,” the state
could “guard its citizens against diseases and paupers” by denying foreigners residence unless “security” was posted “to indemnify the public
should they become paupers.”81 Apparently acting on this suggestion,
in 1852 the California legislature enacted a law requiring a bond of five
hundred dollars per noncitizen passenger.82
By 1855, the legislature had gotten bolder and enacted a direct tax
titled “An Act to Discourage the Immigration to This State of Persons
Who Cannot Become Citizens Thereof ”83—in other words, to discourage the immigration of nonwhites because, since 1790, Congress had
limited naturalization to “a free white person.”84 The 1855 California
law required ship masters or owners to pay a fifty-dollar head tax for
any person “incompetent” to become a citizen.85 This unsubtle law was
struck down two years later by the California Supreme Court in People
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v. Downer, which arose from an action to exact $12,750 from a ship
bearing Chinese passengers.86
Undaunted, the California legislature in 1858 enacted another unsubtle law in an attempt to steer immigration policy—“An Act to Prevent
the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to This State”—
which forbade Chinese or Mongolians from entering the state or its
ports.87 The act made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment for three months to a year, for Chinese to land or to bring Chinese in.88 When California attempted to enforce the law, the California Supreme Court declared it void and unconstitutional in an opinion
never reported.89
In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a modified version of
the California statute requiring the posting of a $500 bond for every
incoming passenger that a state-appointed “Commissioner of Immigration” deemed “lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm,” a
convict or “lewd or debauched woman,” or otherwise “a public charge,
or likely soon to become so.”90 Justice Field, riding circuit, had earlier
ordered the release of Chinese women held under the statute as an
impermissible state interference with the exclusive federal power over
“the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this
country and residence therein.”91
Enfolded in Justice Field’s analysis were burgeoning equality concerns. He stated that anti-Chinese feelings could not “justify any legislation for their exclusion, which might not be adopted against the
inhabitants of the most favored nations of the Caucasian race, and of
Christian faith.”92 He deplored the discriminatory application of laws by
state officials who were “shocked when a frail child of China is landed
on our shores, and yet allow[] the bedizened and painted harlot of other
countries to parade our streets and open her hells in broad day, without molestation and without censure.”93 He suggested that an alternative
basis for invalidating the legislation was the newly enacted legislation
of 1870, implementing the equal protection guarantee of the recently
adopted Fourteenth Amendment.94 In Chy Lung v. Freeman, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the law impermissibly interfered with
the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, reasoning in essence that one state could not inflict nationwide externalities marring foreign relations and trade.95
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While the Court did not address the discrimination argument Justice Field had made, it obliquely deplored the “extraordinary statute”
that gave the commissioner arbitrary discretion to require bonds for
any passenger who appeared to him to be an “idiot” or a potential “pauper” or “lewd woman.”96 Such unbounded discretion opened the door
to “systematic extortion of the grossest kind,” the Court wrote.97 The
specter of discrimination was thus obliquely acknowledged in the guise
of concern over the law’s conferral of open-ended discretion through
the use of vague terms. Chy Lung’s arbitrariness analysis was thus an
intriguing precursor to vagueness doctrine cases a century later, such as
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, which addressed antidiscrimination concerns in the guise of arbitrariness and vagueness analysis.98
The legislature and localities also tried alternative ways to drive out
the Chinese, such as through licensing, taxes, and employment and
housing laws.
California was particularly hard hit by the 1870s recession, the worst
the fledgling nation had experienced, and widespread unemployment,
mortgage foreclosures, and homelessness stirred radical reactions and
calls for state constitutional reform.99 The anti-Chinese campaign was
intensifying, stirred by rabble rousers such as Dennis Kearney of the
self-styled “Workingmen’s Party.”100 The resulting revised California
Constitution of 1879 included an article, simply titled “Chinese,” that
forbade corporations from employing any Chinese or Mongolian and
forbade the employment of Chinese in any state, county, municipal, or
other public work “except in punishment for crime.”101 Lest there be any
doubt about the intent behind the legislation, the final section declared,
“The presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the United
States is declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the
Legislature shall discourage their immigration by all the means within
its power.”102
In response, the legislature enacted laws criminalizing the employment of Chinese on pain of fines, imprisonment of at least two hundred days and up to two years, and, upon a second conviction, forfeiture of the corporate charter, franchise, and privileges.103 Businessman
Tiburcio Parrott was imprisoned for an alleged violation of the law.104
He appealed his conviction, arguing first that the anti-Chinese law was
void because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and legislation

Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration

>>

243

implementing the equal protection guarantee.105 Two judges wrote for
the federal Circuit Court for the District of California, which invalidated the conviction and voided the anti-Chinese employment laws.
Judge Hoffman noted, in an early interest-tying type of argument, that
the law “might equally well have forbidden the employment of Irish, or
Germans, or Americans, or persons of color, or it might have required
the employment of any of these classes of persons to the exclusion of
the rest.”106
Judge Hoffman ultimately framed his decision, however, not in the
violation of the rights of the Chinese but in the violation of the rights of
corporations, many of which, he noted, had ceased operations or faced
closure if the anti-Chinese laws were enforced.107 He held that the right
of corporations “to utilize their property, by employing such laborers
as they choose” could not be overridden by the prohibited purpose of
driving the Chinese out.108 Judge Sawyer, in contrast, was less shy about
directly ruling that the California law was in violation of treaty protections, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment and laws implementing the Fourteenth Amendment that gave “all persons” the “same right”
to make and enforce contracts and enjoy “full and equal benefit of all
laws.”109
These skirmishes with aggressive state anti-immigrant legislation
thus enfolded antidiscrimination concerns within alternate frames
of invalidation that made shared interests in foreign commerce and
vibrant business salient. The deployment of alternate frames for vindicating antidiscrimination values helped transition a fractured and
polarized polity in a time of social strain. These alternate modes of
analysis underscored the shared interests at stake in ameliorating the
harsh state legislation. Ultimately, these transitional frames paved the
way for the development of antidiscrimination doctrine—including
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which invalidated the selective prosecution of Chinese laundry operators on equal protection grounds.110 The Supreme
Court famously held,
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
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their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the constitution.111

The many skirmishes with aggressive state legislation directly or indirectly interfering with the admission and expulsion of the Chinese had
sensitized the judicial eye to the underlying impact and intent behind
formal legal guises.
Part of the point of examining the history of unruly state and local
passions is to show how even as law evolves, new forms can be vehicles
for old impulses to drive out racially distinctive others. The lesson is
important for our avowedly “postracial” times when racialized anxieties cannot be voiced openly aloud and must be dressed in legitimizing
constructs that still pursue old goals.

III. Alternate Frames for Antidiscrimination Values
While the legislation creating proxy vehicles for venting racialized animosities rightly rouse fears of racialized harms, antidiscrimination law
supplies scant succor. The Equal Protection Clause has a very high hurdle for plaintiffs to surmount, requiring proof of discriminatory intent
behind the law112 or discrimination in the claimant’s case, if discriminatory application is alleged.113 Savvy officials socialized in contemporary
forms and conventions of behavior generally no longer provide such
blatant evidence.
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause’s conscious-purpose standard
altogether neglects the problems of implicit bias or racialized anxieties
and angers that are unconscious or not fully acknowledged to ourselves
but that nonetheless generate racialized harm.114 Constitutional criminal-procedure protections also offer no succor for racial harms because
criminal-procedure doctrine simply directs claimants to the strictures
and blind spots of equal protection doctrine.115 Antidiscrimination concerns can, however, inform alternate frames for assessing the validity
of the laws. The dangers of discrimination posed by the most aggressive forms of new state laws can conflict with the balance struck by federal law between enforcement and antidiscrimination and be impliedly
preempted. The risk of harm against suspected foreign nationals poses
foreign policy complications that impermissibly intrude on the federal
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power over foreign affairs. And the unleashing of discriminatory exclusion posed by the campaign against native-born children of noncitizens
should inform interpretation of constitutional text framed to protect
against the dangers of carving out a lower caste.
A. Informing Conflict Analyses
The recent opinion in Arizona v. United States offers excellent examples of
how preemption analysis can reframe—and be enriched by—the shared
interest in antidiscrimination values. Writing for the Court in affirming
the invalidation of three controversial provisions of Arizona Senate Bill
1070, Justice Kennedy captured the harms to the national interest posed
by the new state immigration laws. In crafting the opinion, Justice Kennedy took care to explain how federal coordination and control in setting
immigration policy serve shared national interests. He explained that the
“broad, undoubted power” of the national government over immigration
policy benefits “trade, investment, tourism and diplomatic relations for
the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in
this country who seek the full protection of its laws.”116 National enforcement discretion served shared interests in “this Nation’s international
relations” and “immediate human concerns.”117 This approach deftly
linked individual and collective interests and harms.
Portions of Justice Kennedy’s preemption analysis explained how the
risk of harassment of disfavored groups also impaired national interests. He began the opinion by explaining the longstanding wisdom that
“[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with protection of the just rights of a country’s own
nationals when those nationals are in another country.”118 Invalidating
§ 6 of the Arizona law, he noted that allowing state officers the power
to arrest aliens on the basis of their assessment of removability—in
disregard of federal procedures and safeguards—risked “unnecessary
harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or
someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials
determine should not be removed.”119 The conflicting state provision
presented an obstacle to the full design and purposes of federal law and
the important national interests served by entrusting removal to the
procedures and discretion of national enforcers.

246

<< Mary Fan

At this early juncture, Justice Kennedy did not invalidate § 2(B)
of the Arizona law, which requires state officials to make reasonable
attempts to check the immigration status of any person stopped and
detained or arrested on reasonable suspicion of unlawful alien status.120
Noting the “basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it
will be enforced” at this early stage, he stated that the opinion did not
“foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.”121 Nevertheless, he gave
Arizona incentive to construe the law in a manner that mitigates the
risk of harassment and prolonged detention.
He warned that “[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns” and referred to the
line of cases invalidating prolonged detention after formally valid (and
potentially pretextual) stops.122 He also noted that the opinion did not
address “whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or
whether this too would be preempted by federal law.”123 Thus, though
the opinion did not directly address the great fear sparking waves of
protests across the nation that people would be harassed on the basis
of racial, linguistic, and cultural heuristics for “looking illegal,” it gave
Arizona incentive to mitigate this concern. This warning was a judicial nudge rather than a dictate, leaving states space to develop policies
while relying on the utility of uncertainty to provide incentive not to
transgress constitutional values.124
B. The Virtues of Alternate Frames for Equality Values
Alternate frames can make shared interests rather than racial difference
and divergence of interests salient, helping ameliorate inflamed perceptions. We become particularly parochial and polarized during times
of economic and political turmoil, and resort to the politics of ferocity
toward the threatening Other to rally a fearful, fractured, and doubting
polity. Racial differentiation and divergence of interests become particularly salient and can operate as blinders. Negative stereotypes can be
particularly pronounced.
Studies have found that an “ego threat” to self-regard activates negative ethnic stereotypes and heightens prejudice against out-groups.125
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Social psychologists have theorized that part of the function of negative stereotypes is to help bolster self-regard.126 It is particularly important in such times for law to help deactivate the tendency to resort to
heightened out-group vilification and remind us of common ground
and interest convergence.
Invalidating the Arizona-style attrition-through-fear laws based on
foreign affairs conflict, as proposed by concurring Judge Noonan in
United States v. Arizona,127 makes shared interests salient. Legislation
is invalidated not to “accommodate” the minorities against the majority will, but to preserve shared interests in unimpaired commerce and
international cooperation on important issues such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court in Arizona v. United States eloquently rendered antidiscrimination norms majoritarian. Vindicating antidiscrimination norms did not
entail a countermajoritarian pitting of an out-group’s interests against
the desires of an already-riled polity. Rather, vindicating antidiscrimination interests was about vindicating the shared interest in federal
structure and not allowing a patchwork of rogue jurisdictions to undermine a carefully crafted national balance.
Another virtue of alternate frames is the ability to bridge across disparate worldviews.128 Someone with a hierarchical worldview, for example, might value federalism structure and foreign affairs power even
if the protection of underprivileged minorities does not have strong
appeal. Someone with an individualistic orientation may find resonant
due process concerns against arbitrary and unchecked government
power, whereas the notion that individual interests should give way
to antidiscrimination and equality interests could be riling. Alternate
frames for antidiscrimination norms can thus help communicate the
import of these interests to the fractious skeptical whose support is
most needed.
Why should the palatability of bases for decisions matter to courts,
which, after all, are customarily conceived as set above the political fray?129 To be effective and realized in reality, decisions need to be
socially contextualized. For the values implanted by courts to be realized in practice, they must take root and be accepted by the polity. Part
of the art of crafting a judgment is to implant ideas that cultivate affinity among those who disagree.130 Judges adjudicating some of the most
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heated questions in our society must craft their standards carefully, cognizant of the risk of backlash and resistance that entrench the very attitudes and legislation that their decisions are trying to ameliorate.131 The
risk of resistance and divergence between pronouncement and practice
is particularly acute on polarizing issues in polarized times.
Commentators have argued in different registers about the value of
grounding equality interventions in shared interests.132 In the context
of the African American struggle for equality, Derrick Bell argued that
progress toward racial equality “will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites.”133 He recalled how couching the
import of enforcing school desegregation orders in terms of federalism principles and respect for the courts’ role of interpreting law had
more widespread appeal.134 In contrast, racial divergence in interests
would undermine realization of equality protections, despite normative commitments and claims.135 Early campaigners for civil rights also
apparently recognized the import of making interest-convergence arguments. For example, countering the spate of anti-Chinese laws, Dr. J. G.
Kerr wrote, “In this warfare against the Chinese, the rights and liberty
of the white man are just as much at stake as those of the Chinaman.
Both must stand or fall together.”136 While Bell’s theory was positivistic, describing the world as it is rather than as it ought to be, there are
prescriptive ramifications to the insight about behavior. As a pragmatic
matter, choosing frames that make interest convergence salient is a way
to better secure necessary majoritarian support for decisions vindicating equality values.
Besides appealing externally to the polity, alternate frames that make
social cohesion and interest convergence salient may also appeal internally to judicial centrists. Reva Siegel recently has illuminated how
“racial moderates” on the Supreme Court adhere to an “antibalkinization perspective” that “privileges laws that expressively affirm universalism and commonality rather than difference and division.”137 This
preference for approaches that ameliorate estrangement and division
may also influence the approach taken to claims of harm posed by laws
facially framed in terms of immigration status, but that have a tense
relationship with race. Judicial decision making is often a group project
wherein internal consensus as well as external consensus must be cultivated. A more palatable pathway that underscores interest convergence
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rather than difference may thus have the double benefit of securing
broader judicial as well as popular support.
The danger of alternate frames is that they may be used to avoid
addressing altogether what is often the biggest concern regarding antiimmigrant laws—the risk of racialized harms. Indeed, particularly in
polarized and fierce times and contexts, there may be a desire to eschew
or elide the vexing and ire-rousing concerns. Who wants to open Pandora’s Box, or even slightly raise the lid, when times are tough enough?
This approach, however, allows wounds to fester wholly unaired and
emboldens the angry and anxious to enact intensifying and multifarious vehicles for venting ire at the expense of out-groups. Alternate
frames are constructive rather than destructive when they take into
account antidiscrimination concerns and address them in ways that are
more palatable across worldviews and less polarizing—not when they
ignore some of the biggest concerns altogether.

Conclusion
History’s repetitions, in different registers and legal forms, teach us the
dangers of overreaching state and local laws used to vent frustrations
on out-groups whose members are either overtly or implicitly racialized. In times of fierce politics, the form and mode of judicial intervention to curb divisive and destructive excesses matters. We must be
attentive to how to manage the inflammation of feeling that gives rise
to the surge of problematic laws. Unity-reinforcing frames of analysis
such as preemption doctrine can be deployed in a manner that renders
salient in more palatable fashion previous national commitments to
antidiscrimination values and help foster the polarization-amelioration
and cooperation necessary to curb the excesses and inflamed perceptions of the times.
Closing his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy eloquently counseled the wisdom of temperance and deliberation in the fierce and fractious domain:
With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national
power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful,
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rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable frustrations
with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal
law.138

As the nation continues to fiercely debate immigration policies, this
wisdom provides an important guide for the future in this fractious
domain.
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